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In his short story “The Sound Machine”, Roald Dahl (1949)
lets his hero, Klausner, develop a machine enabling to per-
ceive the sounds of plants. When he puts on his headphones,
he can hear the painful shrieks, while his neighbour prunes his
roses. To test his machine further, Klausner cuts a wound into
a tree and gets shocked about the moaning sound coming from
the wounded tree. Terrified, he calls his doctor to witness,
what he has heard in his headphones and, thus, to relieve
him from the suspicion that he fell prone to insanity.
This story might appear as an ironic prelude for a contro-
versial debate that has been shaking the plant community
since a couple of years. Can plants develop emotions, intelli-
gence and sentience just in the way as we humans do, and
Homo sapiens, intoxicated by anthropocentric arrogance, is
just too tunnel-viewed to perceive this? Alternatively, are we
unable to realise these features, because they are simply absent
in plants? Both viewpoints exist and they seem to mark a
canyon that is difficult to bridge. However, it might be useful
to let both positions collide—development is usually requiring
polarities to advance, and so does science.
A central topic in this controversy is the question, whether
plants are able to feel pain. To answer this question is far from
trivial. We know quite well, whether we ourselves feel pain.
However, already the question, whether our fellow humans
feel pain and to what degree their pain corresponds to ours,
is difficult to judge. We help ourselves by assessing the
expression of pain, making use of mirror neurons that allow
us and other primates to mimic actions of others and, thus, to
recapitulate their emotions from the simulation of their facial
expression (Singer et al. 2004). Empathy comes from reso-
nance, and resonance depends on similarity (this is true for
physics as well as it is true for psychology). As soon as the
similarity decreases, our ability to feel empathy rapidly drops
as well. The pain of a cute dog will still arise our spontaneous
sympathy, while the squirming worm on our fishing hook
almost escapes our attention. To perceive, whether and how
plants respond to damage, requires already sophisticated ex-
perimentation, not so different from Klausner’s sound
machine.
As special and even esoteric this debate may seem, it is
nothing else than a very common theme in biology: whether
two, obviously different, phenomena are just different mani-
festations of the same thing, or whether they are so different,
because there is nothing underneath that could be called “the
same thing”, is a salient question in evolutionary theory.
Things can be alike without having a common essence (con-
vergence), or they can be alike, because they derive from the
same origin (homology). To deduce homology, requires
comparing the two items. As a first step of comparison, we
have to align them. This holds true for the sequence of two
proteins, whose homology we want to infer, or for the two
skeletons, from which we can deduce (when we lay them out
side by side) that the arm of a human corresponds to the wing
of a bird, although both structures look quite different (Belon
du Mans 1555). Two contributions to the current issue, a crit-
ical review by Robinson et al. (2021), and a response by
Baluška and Yokawa (2021), are doing nothing else than lead-
ing a debate about convergence versus homology on the topic
of pain in plants.
A central argument in the debate runs as follows: anaes-
thetics can silence consciousness and perception in humans,
including pain. They also can silence the responses of plants to
exogenous factors, including responses to damage. Therefore,
these silenced responses to damage correspond to the silenced
responses of humans to damage and, thus, correspond to pain.
In their review, Robinson et al. (2021) dissect this argu-
ment. They first concede that anaesthetics do evoke effects in
plants, including both local responses, such as changes of ion-
channel activity, but also systemic responses, such as
jasmonate-based signalling. However, they emphasise that
most anaesthetics affect multiple targets (that are also present
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in other life forms) and that the specific effect on humans
originates from their modulation of neural activity. If this
specificity derives from the presence of neurons, the absence
of neurons would argue against a homology, but in favour of a
convergence. To substantiate this point, they systematically
define the phenomenon of pain and dissect it into different
components, as there are a discriminative, a cognitive, an af-
fective, a stress- and fear-related and a physiological element.
They also elaborate how these components associate with dif-
ferent regions of the brain, rendering pain a very complex, in
the true sense of the word, holistic, experience. They further
point out that pain can occur even without damage. Thus, the
ability to sense damage (nociception) is not the same thing as
the experience of pain.
After having defined the concept of pain and the compo-
nents being part of it, they, basically, develop a classical evo-
lutionary argument, asking, to what extent these components
are present or absent, when one moves away from humans.
For the mammals, this is straightforward, because they pos-
sess all components present also in the human pain system.
These include nociceptors, pain pathways, subcortical brain
regions and the various pain-related areas of the cerebral cor-
tex. This turns out to be already less straightforward in the
non-mammalian vertebrates that lack a cortex. The notion that
these vertebrates should therefore not be able to experience
pain would contradict common sense (and by the way, all
legislation of civilised countries). The argument is here that
the subcortical pain regions are still present and that other
structures functionally replace the cortical components of the
mammalian pain system, such as the cerebral hemispheres of
birds.
The authors step now further towards the invertebrates.
Here, the neural system has developed independently, and
homology holds valid only for the nociceptors. Here, the au-
thors use a convergence argument stating that one needs to
consider pain-indicating behaviour for assessment. The
criteria are learning from painful experience to avoid damage,
or places, where they had experienced damage earlier, cura-
tive behaviour such as guarding wounds, or the self-delivery
of analgesic pain relievers. They conclude that, among the
invertebrates, arthropods and cephalopods meet these criteria,
and therefore, are life forms definitely capable of pain experi-
ence (which is in line with most legislation on animal exper-
imentation). The authors argue now that operant learning or
conditioned place aversion are absent in plants. Nevertheless,
they go on defining two criteria required for pain experience.
The first is the presence of nociceptors. While there are no
obvious plant candidates for nociceptive cells, there exist ion
channels as those participating in animal nociception, and
there exist mechanosensitive systems in both life forms. To
what extent these are fulfilling the same function remains an
open question. To what extent they are homologues remains
an even more open question. However, the authors do not
bluntly exclude this possibility. They rather focus on the sec-
ond argument that plants lack a system to integrate and expe-
rience damage, because they lack neurons and a brain. While
they concede that, in plants, damage can evoke long-distance
chemical and electrical signals as well, they dismiss them as
analogues to the pain system of animals. They spell this out in
more detail, for instance, by questioning, whether plant homo-
logues of the neural GABA receptors are playing the same
functions (and thus, might serve as homology marks for a
plant neural system), or whether plant compounds produced
in response to wounding, such as divinyl ether or ethylene are
self-anaesthetics. In summary, they arrive at the conclusion
that the molecular, cellular and supercellular details of damage
responses are different in both essence and functional context,
and hence not homologous and not even convergent. Using
the terminology of Remane (1952), who defined criteria to
infer homology, the damage response of plants would not be
homologous to the pain system of animals, because it does not
meet the criterion of specific quality.
What is now the viewpoint of Baluška and Yokawa (2021)
on plant anaesthetics? They begin with a short historic over-
view on the position of plants in the system of nature—while
first settled somewhere at the margin of life, close to the min-
erals (Aristotle, Kant), they were later found to be endowed
with complex sensory and adaptive systems. Around fifteen
years ago, the authors have coined the concept of a plant
neurobiology, drawing an analogy between membrane poten-
tials and voltage-gated ion channels that are also present in
plants (as well as in all other life forms) and the electric sig-
nalling of neurons. The existence of action potentials in some
(specialised) plants, the endocytic recycling of vesicles as it is
also found in neural synapses, and intercellular adhesion do-
mains that compare to synaptic connections serve as criteria to
underpin the concept that plants, while not possessing a neural
system, possess something that acts like a neural system. They
admit that this comparison raises terminological issues, be-
cause terms that describe brain-related or at least neuron-
related phenomena move out from their original context. To
elaborate their analogy further, they emphasise that all living
organisms need sensory systems and the ability to adapt to
their environment. In addition, they list agency, cognition
and behaviour as fundamental attributes of life (contesting that
the manifestation of these properties differs between different
life forms). After laying out this conceptual framework, they
are then investigating the effect of anaesthetics upon plants.
One of the molecular targets for anaesthetics are neural
lipid rafts, harbouring specific phospholipase D members, im-
portant signalling hubs that are also present in plants and as-
sociate with plant lipid rafts. They propose that fluorescent
markers and mutant lines might help to see a potential effect
of anaesthetics, which would represent a testable implication
of their hypothesis. They continue in pointing out that plant-
derived compounds act as anaesthetics (which would
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correspond to the analgesic pain-reliever criterion to assess
pain expression in invertebrates). As one example, they use
the stress hormone ethylene, which was in use to anesthesise
humans up to the 1930. This interpretation gets strong criti-
cism by Robinson et al. (2021) that emphasise that ethylene is
acting as a hormone, rather than as an anaesthetic, and that the
fact that ethylene has anaesthetic effects in humans does not
mean that it conveys this function in plants. In fact, while
plants do produce numerous compounds with analgesic ef-
fects (which is an important aspect of the medical use of plants
for human medicine), many of those compounds target to
attacking herbivores (prominent examples are the poppy opi-
ates or the hemp cannabinoids, where the plant compound
mimics endogenous analgetic compounds of the animal), rath-
er than upon the plant itself. For their argument, the case of
methyl salicylate is interesting, though, because this com-
pound acts antagonistic to jasmonate signalling and, thus,
can suppress the wounding response.
They address then the case of plant GABA receptors,
defending their interpretation that these might serve as homol-
ogy marks for a “neural” nature of plant cells. They point out
that plants and animals share the antagonism between gluta-
mate and GABA on membrane voltage and that glutamate
(one of the targets for anaesthetics) takes part in modulating
action potentials in plants. Further, they mention that the al-
kaloid berberine can interfere with glutamate-dependent sig-
nalling in neurons (they do not discuss whether this is a further
mechanism to deter herbivores, or whether they think that
berberine acts as a kind of plant endorphine). This line of
argument would again be of the specific quality type
(Remane 1952). However, in contrast to Robinson et al.
(2021), they conclude that the details of GABA and glutamate
signalling would support a homology of plant and neural cells,
proposing, “neuron-like electrical long distance […] assem-
bles plant bodies into coherent units acting as single cognitive
selves”. They conclude by inverting their historic starting
point and state that the notion of plants as life forms void of
sensory and cognitive faculties would have serious conse-
quences for our way to deal with trees and forests.
While both contributions use homology arguments (specif-
ic quality) to compare human pain experience with plant
nociception, they arrive at different conclusions. Editorial
neutrality prevents to take a stand in this debate, but it may
be helpful to formulate two questions, as well as to propose a
terminological specification:
Pain is a holistic experience as pointed out in detail by
Robinson et al. (2021). This requires that there is some
“body”, i.e., an experiencing entity. In humans and in animals,
the concept of a body means—it is distinct, defined and
endowed with a strongly hierarchical structure, whose genesis
depends on a tight genetic control and is mostly independent
from environmental variability. Has the “body” of a plant
really the same essence, or does a plant “body” resemble a
collective system composed of relatively autonomous cells
that can flexibly respond to the environment through dynamic
self-organisation?
Pain is also a temporal experience—the time scale of ani-
mals that move and use movements as signals (we use the
term behaviour to describe this phenomenon) is different from
plant time that gets its structure from developmental re-
sponses. The cases, where these responses are fast enough to
become perceived by us, are specialised—the venus fly trap or
the mimosa leaf have attracted so much attention, because
they deviate from that what plants normally do. While electri-
cal phenomena occur in all life forms, because they are the
natural consequence of selective membrane permeability, this
does not necessarily imply that these electrical phenomena act
as signals. Whether an event or a molecule becomes a signal,
depends not on its own essence, but on the functional context,
as Karl Bühler (1934) pointed out in his Organon model. It
would be an important question to discuss, whether electrical
phenomena have the same functional context in animals and
in plants.
A terminological definition might also help to render the
debate more fruitful. To create an opposition between plants
as “senseless automata” and plants as “cognitive selves” does
not leave much space for any bridging positions in-between.
There is probably little dispute about the fact that plants are
very successful life forms, because they have evolved com-
plex, flexible and highly efficient signalling. Thus, they are
definitely sensitive beings. It would be helpful to separate this
from the discussion, whether they are sentient beings.
What would Klausner contribute to this debate? We
will never know—in a typical Dahlian move, he tries to
make the doctor hear what he has heard and takes a
second swing, when a large branch crashes down and
destroys the machine. Thus, the doctor has to remain
agnostic. Nevertheless, he accepts Klausner’s wish to
care the wounds with iodine.
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